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Forerunners or scaremongers? 
Germany to abandon nuclear power
Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż
The German government’s final decision to abandon nuclear power as of 
2022 has been expected for months. However, instead of calming the wa-
ters, providing solutions and answering the question ‘What next?’, it has 
only fanned the flames. Even the adoption of legal amendments enforcing 
the government’s decision by the German parliament (both the Bundestag 
and the Bundesrat) in late June and early July has not calmed the situa-
tion. It is more than apparent that these decisions have been made under 
emotional pressure: there was not enough time for accurate calculations 
to be made and consideration to be given to the consequences of Germany 
abandoning nuclear power. Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far been una-
ble to fully convince the public that the ‘energy shift is a huge opportunity’ 
and that this process will be carried out on condition that ‘the supplies 
remain secure, the climate protected and the whole process economically 
efficient’1. German economic associations have warned against a politi-
cally motivated, ill-judged and irreversible abandonment of nuclear energy. 
They are anxious about an increase in electricity prices, the instability of 
supplies and environmental damage. The government believes, however, that 
green technologies will become a new driving force for the German economy 
and its main export commodity. Before that happens the industry will have 
to increase its use of electricity produced from fossil fuels, mainly natural gas 
imported from Russia. This may be exploited by Gazprom which will try to 
strengthen its position on the German market, and thus in the entire EU.
The government: the burden of taking the initiative
On	June	30,	the	Bundestag	voted	on	the	abandonment	of	nuclear	power	 in	Germany	by	
2022.	 Christian	Democrat	MPs,	 the	 Liberals	 and	members	 of	 the	 SPD	 and	 the	Greens	
adopted	the	amendments	to	the	Atomic	Energy	Act	with	the	vast	majority	of	votes	(513	for,	
79	against,	8	abstentions).	On	July	8,	the	Bundesrat,	the	chamber	representing	the	German	
federal	states,	endorsed	the	decision	made	by	the	Bundestag.	However,	Chancellor	Angela	
Merkel	was	kept	in	anxiety	about	the	outcome	of	the	vote	till	the	very	end.	During	the	straw	
vote	on	the	amendments	to	the	Atomic	Energy	Act,	conducted	by	the	parliamentary	factions,	
several	Christian	Democratic	and	liberal	MPs	voted	against	or	abstained.	The	CSU,	which	
has	been	a	bastion	of	the	nuclear	lobby,	is	in	a	state	of	upheaval	and	its	members	refuse	to	
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understand	the	party’s	chairman	volte-face:	Horst	Seehofer	has	recently	has	become	one	
of	the	greatest	opponents	of	nuclear	power.
The	unstable	situation	in	the	ruling	coalition	and	the	desire	to	enter	into	a	‘new	social	con-
tract’	made	Chancellor	Merkel	seek	a	political	and	social	compromise	with	the	opposition.	
The	SPD	and	the	Greens	eventually	supported	the	government’s	project,	but	the	Chancel-
lor	had	to	go	out	of	her	way	to	persuade	those	who	in	fact	had	long	since	been	convinced.	
Despite	the	impressive	results	of	surveys2	which	show	that	64%	of	Germans	are	against	nucle-
ar	energy	and	that	56%	demand	that	nuclear	power	be	abandoned	immediately,	the	govern-
ment’s	decision	has	been	questioned	by	many	prominent	German	politicians	and	experts3.
The Greens: what now?
The	 initial	 enthusiasm	 and	 satisfaction	 that	 broke	 out	 in	 the	 opposition	 camp	 after	
the	government’s	decision	to	abandon	nuclear	power	was	soon	replaced	by	reflection	and	
consternation.	Even	though	the	SPD	has	pledged	support	for	the	government’s	proposal,	
it	repeatedly	reproached	the	cabinet	with	having	to	vote	in	its	own	projects	over	and	over	
again	(which	it	first	did	in	2002,	when	Gerhard	Schröder’s	government	decided	to	aban-
don	nuclear	power).	The	Greens’	reaction	was	different.	On	the	one	hand,	the	party	has	
achieved	 an	 irrefutable	 victory	 –	 its	 key	 demand	 to	 give	 up	 nuclear	 power	 in	Germany	
was	being	fulfilled.	On	the	other	hand,	the	decision	of	the	coalition	and	the	fact	that	An-
gela	Merkel’s	 government	 has	 taken	 the	
initiative	 have	 created	 several	 problems.	
The	fact	that	the	Greens’	project	envisaged	
the	 abandonment	 of	 nuclear	 energy	 4-5	
years	earlier	was	only	one	of	the	problems.	
A	heated	debate	broke	out	within	the	party	
with	two	factions	clashing:	the	faction	of	
the	pragmatists	(who	supported	the	ruling	
coalition’s	plan	–	albeit	with	some	amend-
ments	 –	 as	 the	 best	 solution	 possible	
in	the	current	situation)	and	the	faction	of	the	fundamentalists	(for	whom	the	adoption	of	
Merkel’s	proposals	would	be	a	betrayal	of	 their	 ideals).	The	calculations	of	experts	who	
warn	that	 the	abandonment	of	nuclear	power	will	be	costly	 for	 the	budget	are	a	 further	
problem.	If	the	costs	of	switching	to	renewable	energy	become	too	heavy	a	burden	for	the	
average	German,	the	public	may	rapidly	withdraw	its	support	for	this	project.	Unfortunately	
for	the	Greens,	parliamentary	elections	are	to	be	held	as	late	as	2013.
However,	the	Green’s	greatest	concern	is	that	they	may	lose	a	substantial	part	of	their	politi-
cal	identity.	What	slogans	will	they	put	on	their	banners	during	the	next	election	if	their	main	
demand	and	an	element	of	their	founding	myth	will	have	been	implemented?	In	the	first	weeks	
of	July	polls	showed	that	the	Greens	lost	several	points	and	ranked	below	the	SPD	with	23%4.
Squaring the circle: the economy says no
In	her	speech	in	the	Bundestag	on	June	9,	2011,	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	admitted	that	
everything	the	government	intends	to	implement	in	seeking	to	construct	a	‘new	architecture	
of	energy	supplies’,	resembles	the	‘squaring	of	the	circle’.	Below	are	just	a	few	of	the	eco-
nomic	and	social	consequences	of	the	decision	to	abandon	nuclear	energy	in	Germany.
In	March	2011,	immediately	after	the	Fukushima	disaster,	the	German	government	decided	
to	shut	down	eight	nuclear	power	plants	with	a	combined	capacity	of	over	8	GW.	In	May	
the	cabinet	decided	this	shutdown	would	be	permanent.	By	the	end	of	2022,	more	nuclear	
	
2	 http://www.finanznachrich-
ten.de/nachrichten-2011-
03/19654156-n24-em-
nid-umfrage-64-prozent-
der-deutschen-gegen-at-
omkraft-56-prozent-fuer-
sofortausstieg-119.htm
3	 http://www.zeit.de/2011/28/
Biedenkopf-Interview
http://www.sueddeutsche.
de/wirtschaft/bdi-praesident-
hans-peter-keitel-im-gespra-
ech-wir-tanzen-nicht-auf-den-
stammtischen-1.1115684
4	 http://www.wahlrecht.de/
umfragen/forsa.htm
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power	plants	will	be	closed	with	a	combined	capacity	of	over	20	GW.	In	2010,	all	these	
plants	produced	approximately	132	TWh	(23%	of	the	total	electricity	production	in	Germa-
ny).	The	share	of	energy	from	renewable	sources	in	electricity	production	(currently	17%)	
may	increase	even	up	to	38%	by	2020,	as	the	government	plans	to	build	large	offshore	
wind	farms	(marine	farms)	and	to	develop	electricity	production	from	solar	energy.	It	is	ex-
pected	that	by	that	time	the	production	of	electricity	from	gas	and	coal-fired	plants	will	have	
increased	significantly,	as	will	have	electricity	imports	to	Germany,	including	from	France	
(produced	from	nuclear	sources)	and	from	Poland	(coal).	Eventually	a	rapid	development	
of	transmission	networks	across	Germany	will	become	a	necessity	(by	2020,	approximately	
4,450	km	of	new	transmission	 lines	are	to	be	built).	Nobody	can	assess	the	exact	cost	
of	these	changes,	but	it	will	certainly	be	tens	of	billions	of	Euros.
German	economic	associations	have	warned	against	a	politically	motivated,	ill-judged	and	ir-
reversible	abandonment	of	nuclear	energy.	They	are	anxious	about	high	electricity	prices	and	
the	instability	of	supplies,	as	well	as	about	environmental	damage,	for	which	the	industry	will	
have	to	pay,	bearing	the	ultimate	cost	of	CO2	emission	certificates	for	German	companies.	
The	stock	quotes	of	major	energy	companies	E.ON	and	RWE	plummeted	immediately	upon	
the	announcement	of	the	German	government’s	decisions.	RWE,	E.ON	and	EnBW	have	al-
ready	taken	legal	proceedings	against	some	
of	these	decisions,	i.e.	the	obligation	to	pay	
tax	on	nuclear	fuel5.
Eight	 laws	have	been	amended	–	starting	
with	 the	 Atomic	 Energy	 Act,	 through	 the	
law	on	renewable	energy,	and	to	the	laws	
regulating	 the	development	of	energy	net-
works.	The	pressure	exerted	on	the	 legis-
lators	was	immense,	as	lobbyists	included	
both	the	heads	of	energy	companies	(who	
until	 recently	 had	 been	 regulars	 at	meet-
ings	 with	 Chancellor	 Merkel)	 and	 their	 opponents.	 A	 new	 influential	 lobby	 has	 emerged,	
which	did	not	exist	back	in	2002	when	German	energy	policy	was	undergoing	the	previous	
breakthrough,	namely	the	green	technology	lobby.	Among	those	who	wanted	to	protect	their	
rights	and	influence	the	final	shape	of	the	laws	passed	were	the	producers	of	renewable	en-
ergy	equipment,	grouped	in	several	associations	(the	most	important	being	Bundesverband	
Erneuerbare	Energie),	municipal	utilities	(Stadtwerke)	and	finally	those	German	federal	states	
where	the	facilities	producing	green	technology	equipment	and	industrial	centres	producing	
components	for	energy	production	from	renewable	sources	are	located.	Federal	states	such	
as	North	Rhine-Westphalia,	with	the	largest	German	coal	mines,	have	been	lobbying	for	fur-
ther	coal	production	to	be	sanctioned	and	for	the	use	of	coal	as	a	‘transitional	technology’.
Will gas save us?
European	Commissioner	for	Energy	Günther	Oettinger,	following	the	decision	by	the	Ger-
man	government,	said	that	gas	would	be	the	main	driving	force	for	growth:	‘More	renew-
able	energy	sources	means	more	gas’.	Ronan	O’Regan,	director	at	the	consulting	firm	PwC,	
explains:	 gas	will	 be	necessary	 as	a	 security	measure	 in	 case	 ‘the	wind	 is	not	blowing	
and	the	sun	does	not	shine’.	Gerhard	Schröder,	the	former	chancellor	and	current	lobbyist	
for	the	Nord	Stream	pipeline,	explains	where	Europe	should	seek	gas:	‘Gas	is	necessary	
as	a	substitute	of	nuclear	energy.	And	you	take	gas	from	where	it	is	found.	The	choices	are	
North	Africa	or	Iran,	but	with	limited	possibilities.	Or	Russia	–	without	any	limits’6.	German	
politicians	(for	example,	spokesmen	for	economic	affairs	from	CDU/CSU	and	FDP	parlia-
	
	
	
	
	
5	 http://www.boerse.ard.
de/content.jsp?key=doku-
ment_537224	
http://www.tagesschau.de/
wirtschaft/enbw130.html
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
6	 http://www.handelsblatt.com/
politik/deutschland/schro-
eder-laestert-ueber-schwarz-
gelb/4269702.html
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mentary	 groupings)	must	 have	 reached	 similar	 conclusions,	 as	 they	 claim	 that	 ‘without	
nuclear	power	Germany	will	be	even	more	interested	in	gas	supplies	from	Russia’.
German	Vice	Chancellor	 and	Minister	 for	 the	Economy	Philipp	Rösler	during	his	 visit	 to	
Moscow	in	June	this	year	discussed	the	prospects	of	gas	supplies	with	Gazprom	CEO	Alexei	
Miller.	Miller	assured	him	that	supplies	to	German	power	plants	are	the	Russian	company’s	
priority.	Moreover,	Gazprom	is	willing	to	become	a	shareholder	in	those	German	companies	
who	are	currently	undergoing	financial	difficulties	–	RWE	and	E.ON.	On	June	14,	Gazprom	
signed	a	memorandum	with	RWE	on	a	strategic	partnership	in	the	construction	of	gas	and	
coal-fired	power	plants	in	Europe.	Russian	investments	in	the	German	energy	market	were	
a	key	issue	(if	not	the	most	important)	discussed	during	the	13th	German-Russian	intergov-
ernmental	consultations	in	July.
Gazprom	can	thus	use	the	problems	of	Ger-
man	companies	 (resulting	 from	 the	aban-
donment	 of	 nuclear	 power,	 but	 also	 from	
unfavourable	 contracts	 concluded	 with	
Gazprom	itself 7)	to	penetrate	even	deeper	
into	 the	German	 energy	market.	By	 now,	
the	 Russian	monopoly	 provides	 as	 much	
as	 40%	 of	 gas	 to	 the	 German	 market,	
and	through	Wingas	(a	subsidiary	of	BASF	
and	Gazprom)	 it	controls	more	than	20%	
of	the	German	gas	market.	If	Gazprom	acquired	E.ON	Ruhrgas	shares,	it	would	gain	access	
to	a	further	50%	of	the	market.	Kirsten	Westphal,	an	expert	from	the	SWP	think	tank,	points	
to	this	risk	and	warns	against	a	significant	increase	in	gas	prices	and	the	lack	of	diversification,	
which	may	jeopardise	Germany’s	energy	security8.
On	the	other	hand,	RWE’s	cooperation	with	Gazprom	in	the	construction	of	new	gas-fired	
power	plants	would	solve	another	of	Germany’s	problems,	namely	the	unwillingness	of	its	
companies	to	invest	in	new	gas-fired	power	plants,	since	they	see	gas	as	merely	a	transi-
tional	fuel	in	energy	production	in	Germany.
Germany abandons nuclear power, 
German corporations aren’t following
Even	though	Germany	has	decided	to	abandon	nuclear	power	and	the	financial	condition	of	
the	country	is	difficult,	German	corporations	have	not	as	yet	given	up	their	plans	to	expand	in	
the	nuclear	energy	sector	in	other	countries.	Both	E.ON	and	RWE	have	plans	to	build	mod-
ern	reactors	abroad	(including	in	the	UK	and	the	Netherlands),	although	it	cannot	be	ruled	
out	that	these	plans	may	need	to	be	re-examined.	After	the	abandonment	of	nuclear	energy,	
the	government	is	not	likely	to	stop	subsidising	German	manufacturers,	contractors	and	sub-
contractors	who	have	exported	nuclear	technologies	to	Brazil,	China,	France,	Russia	and	South	
Korea9.	These	subsidies,	apart	 from	securing	payments	for	exporters	from	German	nuclear	
industry,	are	to	support	the	development	of	the	largest	corporations.	Stricter	safety	criteria	for	
the	construction	of	reactors	will	be	adopted	throughout	the	world	and	will	entail	the	construc-
tion	of	modern	reactors,	which	will	help	those	German	corporations	which	work	on	modern	
technology	abroad	to	increase	their	profits.
Germany’s	 abandonment	 of	 nuclear	 power	 has	 already	 brought	 about	 far-reaching	 conse-
quences	 for	 the	 entire	 EU.	 Following	 the	 decision	 of	 the	German	 government,	 the	 French	
Energy	minister	demanded	a	special	meeting	of	EU	ministers	be	held,	and	raised	concerns	that	
the	stability	of	energy	supplies	for	Germany’s	neighbours	may	be	at	risk.	So	far,	exports	of	elec-
tricity	from	Germany	have	been	a	security	measure	for	its	neighbours	in	the	case	of	increased	
7	 http://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/eastwe-
ek/2010-03-03/gazprom-ma-
kes-its-gas-trade-europe-more-
flexible
8	 http://www.swp-berlin.org/
de/kurz-gesagt/energiewende-
und-gas.html
9	 http://dip21.bundestag.de/
dip21/btd/17/055/1705532.
pdf
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power, but also from unfavourable 
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the German energy market.
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demand	for	electrical	energy.	This	applied	to	Brittany	and	parts	of	Provence	in	France,	as	well	
as	to	Belgium,	the	Netherlands	and	even	Austria	–	Europe’s	sworn	enemy	of	nuclear	power.
What	is	also	likely	is	Germany’s	eagerness	to	tighten	safety	criteria	for	nuclear	power	plants	
in	the	EU,	to	reform	the	Euratom	Treaty,	and	to	impose	binding	regulations	concerning	the	safety	
criteria	on	other	EU	member	states,	for	example,	by	including	them	in	the	Lisbon	Treaty.
A new flywheel for the German economy
Green	technologies	have	long	been	at	the	centre	of	attention	for	German	politicians.	Even	the	cur-
rent	government,	which	in	the	past	had	prolonged	the	operation	of	nuclear	power	plants,	claims	
that	energy	based	on	nuclear	power	is	merely	a	bridging	technology,	while	the	ultimate	goal	is	
to	switch	the	economy	to	green	technologies	and	renewable	energy	sources.	Germany	has	long	
been	one	of	the	world’s	leading	promoters	of	renewables,	and	it	perceives	these	technologies	
as	a	chance	to	escape	the	consequences	of	‘Peak	oil’10	but	also	to	maintain	its	high	position	
in	 the	 rankings	 of	 international	 trade.	
The	green	energy	sector	could	become	the	
flywheel	 for	 the	 entire	 German	 economy.	
According	 to	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	 Ger-
man	Federal	Ministry	 for	 the	Environment,	
the	sale	of	green	technologies	in	2020	is	set	
to	 equal	 the	 total	 sales	 of	 automotive	 and	
machine	industries,	which	so	far	have	been	
the	most	important	export	sectors	of	Germany.
In	the	years	2004-2010,	employment	in	the	renewable	energy	sector	increased	by	129%	to	
367,400	workers.	Incidentally,	it	is	the	only	energy	sector	which	increased	employment	between	
1998	and	2009.	All	other	sectors	noted	a	decline	in	employment:	pit-coal	industry	(-44%),	gas	
(-44%),	brown	coal	(-35%),	nuclear	energy	(-23%),	and	even	the	construction	sector	(-24%).
Manufacturers	of	renewable	energy	technologies	are	primarily	small	and	medium	entities	in-
volved	 in	designing,	manufacturing	and	distributing	 the	equipment	and	components,	energy	
distribution,	and	financial	and	consulting	services.	By	2030,	the	share	of	renewables	in	German	
GDP	is	expected	to	reach	3%11.	Profits	from	exports	of	equipment	for	the	production	of	renewa-
ble	energy	currently	amount	to	approximately	€8	billion,	and	profits	from	exports	of	components	
for	the	production	of	this	equipment	amount	to	€12	billion.	Europe	remains	the	largest	market	
for	German	manufacturers	 and	distributors	 from	 this	 sector,	 receiving	45%	of	 total	 exports	
of	green	technologies.	The	vast	majority	of	these	exports	go	to	European	Union	states.
Germany’s	volte-face	in	the	energy	sector	could	have	been	the	most	important	project	not	only	
for	the	current	government,	but	also	for	several	succeeding	German	cabinets.	It	could	have	be-
come	one	of	those	‘great	ideas’	whose	time	was	thought	to	have	passed	irrevocably,	but	which	
are	nevertheless	sought	after	by	the	elite	in	many	European	countries.	It	could	have	been	all	
of	these,	had	this	been	an	evolutionary	process.	However,	Germany	has	opted	for	the	revolu-
tionary	way,	and	therefore	the	success	of	this	project	now	depends	not	only	on	the	determina-
tion	of	the	ruling	elite,	but	also	on	society,	which	will	bear	as	yet	unknown	burdens.
In the years 2004-2010, employment 
in the renewable energy sector incre-
ased by 129% to 367,400 workers – 
and it was the only energy sector 
to increase employment between 
1998 and 2009.
